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Abstract: The focus of this work is on designing influencing strategies to shape the collective
opinion of a network of individuals. We consider a variant of the voter model where opinions
evolve in one of two ways. In the absence of external influence, opinions evolve via interactions
between individuals in the network, while, in the presence of external influence, opinions shift
in the direction preferred by the influencer. We focus on a finite time-horizon and an influencing
strategy is characterized by when it exerts influence in this time-horizon given its budget
constraints. Prior work on this opinion dynamics model assumes that individuals take into
account the opinion of all individuals in the network. We generalize this and consider the setting
where the opinion evolution of an individual depends on a limited collection of opinions from
the network. We characterize the nature of optimal influencing strategies as a function of the
way in which this collection of opinions is formed.
Keywords: Opinion Dynamics, Voter Model, Random Graphs, Stochastic Approximation
1. INTRODUCTION
The field of opinion dynamics has attracted a lot of atten-
tion across domains including physics, mathematics, and
epidemiology. A popular and widely studied binary opinion
dynamics model is the voter model (Clifford and Sud-
bury (1973); Holley and Liggett (1975)). Many variants
of the voter model have been proposed and studied, for
instance, the linear threshold model proposed in Kempe
et al. (2003), the majority model proposed in Grtner and
Zehmakan (2017), the conformist model and the strong-
willed model studied in Kumar et al. (2018), and the rebel
model studied in Saxena et al. (2020).
Motivated by applications like advertising and political
campaigning, designing influencing strategies to shape
opinions in networks is another area that has seen a
lot of work, e.g., Kandhway and Kuri (2014); Kotnis
et al. (2017); Kempe et al. (2005); Eshghi et al. (2017);
Kumar et al. (2018). Refer to Eshghi et al. (2017) for a
comprehensive survey of works in this field. A related body
of research focuses on designing strategies to prevent/slow
down the spread of a disease in a network includes works
like Asano et al. (2008); Ledzewicz and Scha¨ttler (2011);
Lashari and Zaman (2012).
In this work, we consider two modes of opinion evolution,
namely, organic evolution like in the voter model due to
interactions with peers, and evolution due to external
influence which attempts to move the network towards
the favored opinion. Closest to our work, Kumar et al.
(2018) and Saxena et al. (2020) also consider this hybrid
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opinion dynamics setting. Time is divided into slots and
an individual is chosen uniformly at random in each time-
slot. Only the chosen individual can change her opinion.
In the absence of external influence, the opinion of the
individual chosen in a time-slot changes with probability
proportional to the fraction of individuals in the network
with the opposing opinion at that time. In time-slots
during which external influence is exerted, the opinion
of the chosen individual is more likely to move in the
direction preferred by the external influence than in time-
slots without external influence. Given an influencing
budget and a fixed time-horizon, the goal is to determine
when to influence within the time-horizon to maximize the
fraction of individuals with the preferred opinion at the
end of the time-horizon. The key takeaway from Kumar
et al. (2018) and Saxena et al. (2020) is that influencing
at the beginning of the time horizon is more effective
than influencing at the end only when individuals with
a favorable opinion are less likely to change their opinion
than individuals with an unfavorable opinion. In all other
cases, the conventional wisdom of advertising towards the
end of the time-horizon is indeed an optimal strategy.
We generalize the setting studied in Kumar et al. (2018)
and Saxena et al. (2020) by considering the case where, in
each time-slot without external influence, the chosen indi-
vidual changes their opinion with probability proportional
to the fraction of individuals with the opposite opinion in
a collection of opinions sought by the chosen individual.
Unlike the setting in Kumar et al. (2018) and Saxena et al.
(2020), this collection need not include the opinions of all
the individuals in the network.
Our goal is to explore if the nature of optimal influencing
strategies obtained in Kumar et al. (2018) and Saxena
et al. (2020) are robust to these modifications. We focus on
two specific ways through which this collection is curated.
In the first case, the chosen individual samples a random
number of opinions, each chosen uniformly at random
from the set of opinions in the network. In this case,
we show that the optimal influencing strategies remain
identical to the case studied in Kumar et al. (2018) and
Saxena et al. (2020). This result holds independent of
the probability distribution of the number of opinions the
chosen individual seeks.
In the second case, we use a fixed graph to model links
between individuals. Each chosen individual only takes
into account the opinion of her neighbors in this graph.
Here, the nature of the optimal influencing strategies
depends on the nature of the graph. For popular network
models like d–regular graphs, Baraba´si Albert graphs and
Erdo¨s Re´nyi graphs, the optimal influencing strategies are
identical to those in the case of the complete graph. An
example where the nature of optimal strategies is not the
same as that in for the complete graph is the hub and spoke
graph where a single node, called the hub has links to all
other nodes in the network, while the remaining nodes are
only connected to the hub.
2. SETTING
2.1 Notation and System Evolution
We consider a finite population of M individuals where
every individual has a binary opinion (Yes or No) about
a specific topic. We study the evolution of the cumulative
opinion of the population in the presence of an external
influencing agency with a limited budget. This agency
attempts to maximize the number of individuals with
opinion Yes at the end of a fixed finite time horizon.
We consider a population of size M and index the indi-
viduals as {1, ...,M}. We divide time into slots of equal
duration. Random variables {Ii(t)}1≤i≤M,t≥0 taking val-
ues in {0, 1}, denote the opinion of the ith individual at
time t, such that
Ii(t) =
{
1, if the opinion of Individual i at time t is Yes
0, if the opinion of Individual i at time t is No.
At time t, let β(t) and δ(t) = 1 − β(t) be the fraction of
people with opinion Yes and No respectively.
In time-slot t, an individual is selected uniformly at ran-
dom and she updates her opinion as follows: the selected
individual, say Individual i, collects opinions from a group
of individuals in the population. The opinion of the Indi-
vidual i is then updated based on the collective opinion in
the group. Let β˜i(t) and δ˜i(t) denote the fraction of Yes
and No opinions in the collection. We consider two ways
in which this collection of opinions is formed.
Setting 1. (Random local interactions). The selected indi-
vidual collects K opinions, each chosen uniformly at ran-
dom from the set of M opinions. Note that there can be
repetitions in the collected opinions. We model K as a
random variable.
Setting 2. (Graph-based local interactions). In this case,
we consider a fixed graph G = (V,E) such that |V | = M .
We think of individuals as the nodes of the graph. Define
Ni = {j : (i, j) ∈ E} as the neighbourhood of i
th
individual. Each individual i, if selected, collects opinions
from her neighbors j ∈ Ni.
The opinion of Individual i chosen in time-slot t evolves ac-
cording to a Markov process with the following transition
probabilities.
P (Ii(t+ 1) = 0|Ii(t) = 1) = pt
P (Ii(t+ 1) = 1|Ii(t) = 1) = 1− pt
P (Ii(t+ 1) = 1|Ii(t) = 0) = qt
P (Ii(t+ 1) = 0|Ii(t) = 0) = 1− qt.
The values of pt and qt depend on whether the individual
is being externally influenced in time-slot t or not. More
specifically,
– If the chosen individual is being externally influenced
in time-slot t, pt = p˜ and qt = q˜ for some fixed
p˜, q˜ ≥ 0.
– Else, the probability of an individual changing her
opinion is proportional to the fraction of contrary
opinions in the collection, i.e., pt = pδ˜i(t) and qt =
qβ˜i(t) for some fixed p, q ≥ 0.
Assumption 1. (Effective Influence). If the chosen individ-
ual has opinion No(/Yes), then the probability of the
individual switching their opinion to Yes(/No) under ex-
ternal influence is more(/less) compared to its value in the
absence of external influence, irrespective of the state of
opinions in the network. Formally, p˜ < p and q˜ > q.
2.2 Goal
We focus on a finite time-horizon of T consecutive time-
slots, indexed 1, 2, · · · , T . Due to budget constraints, the
external influencing agency can influence in at most bT ,
b ∈ [0, 1] out of the T time-slots. The goal is to determine
when to exert external influence in order to maximize the
fractions of individuals with opinion Yes at the end of time-
slot T .
Definition 1. (Optimal Strategy). An influence strategy is
characterized by the indices of the time-slots in which
external influence is exerted. We call an influence strategy
optimal if it results in at least as many expected number
of individuals with opinion Yes at the end of time T as
under any other strategy.
3. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we introduce the mathematical framework
used in the rest of this paper.
Suppose Individual i is chosen at time t. She updates her
opinion as follows:
Ii(t+ 1) = Ii(t) + ξi(t+ 1), (1)
where, ξi(t + 1) is a random variable taking values in
{−1, 0, 1} and denotes the change in the opinion of In-
dividual i in time-slot t. We are interested in the fraction
of individuals with opinion Yes in the population given by
β(t) =
1
M
M∑
i=1
Ii(t), which evolves as follows:
β(t + 1) = β(t) +
1
M
ξ(t+ 1), (2)
where ξ(t + 1) ∈ {−1, 0, 1} denotes the change in net
opinion at time t. Thus, conditioned on the event that
Individual i is selected at time t, ξ(t + 1) = ξi(t +
1). Let Ft denote the σ-field generated by the random
variables {ξ(1), ξ(2), ..., ξ(t)}. The evolution of the opinion
is governed by the random process ξ(t). Since the evolution
depends on whether the selected individual has opinion
Yes or No at time t, we have:
P (ξ(t+ 1) = x|Ft) =

β(t)pt for x = −1
(1− β(t))qt for x = 1
1− qt − β(t)(pt − qt) for x = 0.
We rewrite (2) as:
β(t+ 1)= β(t) +
1
M
E[ξ(t+ 1)|Ft]
+
1
M
[ξ(t+ 1)− E[ξ(t+ 1)|Ft]],
where, ξ(t+ 1)− E[ξ(t+ 1)|Ft] is a Martingale difference
sequence.
To analyze the evolution of random variable β(t), we use
the theory of constant step-size stochastic approximation.
A constant step-size stochastic approximation scheme is
given by the following iteration for x ∈ Rd and a > 0.
Formally,
xn+1 = xn + a[h(xn) +Mn+1], n ≥ 0, (3)
such that:
– h : R→ Rd is Lipschitz.
– {Mn}n≥0 is a square-integrable Martingale difference
sequence with respect to a suitable filtration.
– {‖xn‖
2} are uniformly integrable.
– supnE[‖xn‖
2]1/2 <∞.
Then, from the theory of stochastic approximation in
Borkar (2008) we know that the iterates of (3) track the
following O.D.E. with high probability:
x˙(t) = h(x(t)), t ≥ 0. (4)
Specific bounds can be found in Lemma 1, Chapter 9 and
Theorem 3, Chapter 9 in Borkar (2008).
Given this, for each setting we consider, we characterize
(3) for β(t) and solve the O.D.E. as given in (4). Since
the solutions of the recursion and that of the O.D.E.
remain close with high probability, it suffices to study the
optimal strategies for the corresponding O.D.E. system.
This approach is widely used and accepted, including in
Kumar et al. (2018) and Saxena et al. (2020).
4. MAIN RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we present our results. We consider the two
settings discussed in Section 2 separately. The proofs are
presented in Section 5.
4.1 Setting 1: Random Local Interactions
Our first result characterizes the optimal policy for Set-
ting 1.
Theorem 1. Under Assumption 1, for Setting 1 discussed
in Section 2,
– if p < q, an optimal strategy is to influence in the
first bT time-slots of the finite time-horizon and the
strategy of influencing in the last bT time-slots is
strictly sub-optimal.
– if p > q, an optimal strategy is to influence in the
last bT time-slots of the finite time-horizon and the
strategy of influencing in the first bT time-slots is
strictly sub-optimal.
– if p = q, all policies which influence in any bT out
of the T time-slots in the finite time-horizon perform
equally well.
We note that this result holds independent of the distri-
bution of K, values of M , T , b and the initial conditions.
This is identical to the result obtained in Theorem 3 in
Kumar et al. (2018). We thus conclude that the nature of
the optimal strategy does not change if the chosen indi-
vidual uses a random sampling of opinions in the network
to shape her opinion instead of taking into account the
opinions of all the individuals, as is done in Kumar et al.
(2018).
4.2 Setting 2: Graph-based local interactions
We now focus on the second setting described in Section
2 where there is a graph connecting the M individuals in
the network and each individual only takes into account
her neighbors’ opinions.
(a) d–regular graphs: Our next result characterizes the
optimal policy when the graph G(V,E) is d–regular.
Theorem 2. Under Assumption 1, for Setting 2 discussed
in Section 2 if the graph G is d–regular, we have:
– if p < q, an optimal strategy is to influence in the
first bT time-slots of the finite time-horizon and the
strategy of influencing in the last bT time-slots is
strictly sub-optimal.
– if p > q, an optimal strategy is to influence in the
last bT time-slots of the finite time-horizon and the
strategy of influencing in the first bT time-slots is
strictly sub-optimal.
– if p = q, all policies which influence in any bT out
of the T time-slots in the finite time-horizon perform
equally well.
We note that this result holds independent of the value of
d, M , T , b and the initial conditions. We thus conclude
that the results obtained in Kumar et al. (2018) for the
complete graph extend to d–regular graphs.
(b) Baraba´si Albert and Erdo¨s Re´nyi graphs: In Figure 1,
via simulations, we show that the same trends are observed
in Baraba´si Albert and Erdo¨s Re´nyi graphs. The models
are among the most widely studied random graphs models.
In addition, Baraba´si Albert graphs have a power-law
degree distribution and are therefore considered suitable
to model many networks including genetic networks, the
World Wide Web and social networks as discussed in
Baraba´si and Albert (1999). As is the case for complete
and d–regular graphs, the strategy to influence in the
beginning (SF ) outperforms the strategy to influence at
the end (SL) if p < q and the opposite is true of p >
q. For p = q, the performance of the two policies is
indistinguishable.
Next, we present an example of a graph for which the trend
of the performance of the policies discussed in Theorem 2
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Fig. 1. BA and ER Graphs: Comparison between the
strategy to influence in the first and last bT time-slots
(SF and SL respectively) where M = 100, T = 500,
p˜ = 0, and q˜ = 0.75. The performance follows the
same trend as for k–regular graphs (Theorem 2)
is different from that for d–regular, Baraba´si Albert, Erdo¨s
Re´nyi and complete graphs.
(c) Hub and Spoke Graphs: A hub and spoke graph
is a graph G = (V,E) with |V | = M , such that one
vertex called the hub, has degreeM−1, while all the other
vertices have degree 1 and are only connected to the hub.
The extreme variation in the degrees of nodes in the graph
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Fig. 2. Hub and Spoke Graphs: Comparison between the
strategy to influence in the first and last bT time-slots
(SF and SL respectively) where M = 500, T = 500,
p˜ = 0, and q˜ = 0.75. The performance does not follow
the same trend as for k–regular graphs (Theorem 2)
and BA and ER graphs (Figure 1)
introduces a high disparity between the influence that the
two kinds of nodes have on the overall opinion dynamics.
In Figure 2, we compare the strategy to influence in the
beginning (SF ) and the strategy to influence at the end
(SL) for the hub and spoke graph. We conclude that unlike
the graph models discussed above, there is no clear trend
in the performance of these two policies for the hub and
spoke graph.
An exact characterization of the optimal influence strategy
for this case is analytically challenging and therefore
remains an open problem. In our next proposition, we
provide some insight into the performance of various
influence strategies under some special cases.
Proposition 1. Under Assumption 1, for Setting 2 dis-
cussed in Section 2 if the graph G is a hub and spoke
graph,
– Consider the case when the hub is not selected in
t ∈ [1, T ]. If the hub has opinion Yes at t = 1, all
strategies perform equally well for all values of p and
q. If hub has opinion No in t = 1, SF is strictly
suboptimal for all values of p and q.
– Let the initial opinion of the hub be Yes, assume that
the hub is chosen exactly once in time-slots 1 to T
and T =M . Then, among the class of strategies that
influence in bT consecutive time-slots, any strategy
that influences the hub outperforms any strategy
which does not influence the hub.
Note that in the setting where T scales slower thanM , the
probability of the hub not being selected goes to 1 as the
network grows larger. Therefore, in this case, the trends
mentioned in the first part of the proposition hold with
high probability for large networks.
In addition, we observe via simulations that the trend
mentioned in the second part of the proposition holds even
if the initial opinion of the hub is No. We omit these results
from this paper due to space constraints.
The key takeaway is that given the special role played by
the hub, the performance of any strategy depends heavily
on whether it influences in the time-slot in which the hub
is chosen or not. As a result, the nature of the optimal
strategy for the hub and spoke graph is not the same as for
the d–regular, Baraba´si Albert, Erdo¨s Re´nyi and complete
graphs. Unlike Setting 1, we thus observe that for Setting
2, while the results obtained in Kumar et al. (2018) extend
to d–regular, Baraba´si Albert and Erdo¨s Re´nyi graphs,
they are not completely robust to graph structure.
5. PROOFS
5.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Let X(t) denotes the node chosen at time t. Thus,
P (X(t) = i) = 1M . Suppose that the chosen individual i
collects K opinions, where K is a random variable taking
values in {1, . . . ,∞} such that P (K = k) = pk. Let ny(t)
denote the number of Yes in the collected opinions. Then,
given the event {K = k}, β˜i(t) = ny(t)/k with probability(
k
ny(t)
)
(β(t))ny(t)(1− β(t))k−ny(t). We have:
P (ξ(t+ 1) = 1|Ft)
=
M∑
i=1
P (Ii(t+ 1) = 1|Ii(t) = 0, X(t) = i)
× P (Ii(t) = 0|X(t) = i)P (X(t) = i)
=
1− β(t)
M
M∑
i=1
P (Ii(t+ 1) = 1|Ii(t) = 0, X(t) = i)
=
q(1− β(t))
M
M∑
i=1
M∑
k=1
k∑
ny(t)=0
ny(t)
k
(
k
ny(t)
)
×
(β(t))ny(t)(1− β(t))k−ny(t)pk
=(1− β(t))β(t)q.
Similarly, P (ξ(t + 1) = −1|Ft) = pβ(t)(1 − β(t). Thus,
E[ξ(t+ 1)|Ft] = (q − p)(1− β(t))β(t).
We can now write a stochastic approximation scheme for
β(t) and obtain the corresponding O.D.E.:
β˙(t) =
(q − p)
M
β(t)(1 − β(t)). (5)
Similarly, the corresponding O.D.E. can be obtained for
time-slots in which external influence exists. The rest of
the proof involves integrating the O.D.E.s over the time
periods with and without influences and then comparing
the performance at T for the two strategies SF and SL.
We skip the details and refer the readers to Saxena et al.
(2020) since the O.D.E.s turn out to be similar to those
obtained for a similar model of opinion evolution on the
complete graph in Saxena et al. (2020).
5.2 Proof of Theorem 2
For a d–regular graph, β˜i(t) = βi(t) =
1
d
∑
j∈Ni
Ij(t). Thus,
β(t) =
1
M
∑
i∈V
βi(t) and βi(t+1) = βi(t)+
1
d
∑
j∈Ni
ξj(t+1).
(6)
When there is no external influence we have:
P (ξi(t+ 1) = x|Ft) =
{
p(1− βi(t)) for x = −1
qβi(t) for x = 1.
From (6), we get:
β(t+ 1)= β(t) +
1
M
∑
i∈V
1
d
∑
j∈Ni
ξj(t+ 1)
= β(t) +
1
M
∑
i∈V
E[ξi(t+ 1)|Ft]
+
1
M
∑
i∈V
(ξi(t+ 1)− E[ξi(t+ 1)|Ft]), (7)
where ξi(t+1)−E[ξi(t+1)|Ft] is a Martingale difference
sequence by definition. Thus (7) is a stochastic approxi-
mation scheme of the form (3). The corresponding O.D.E.
is given by:
β˙(t) =
1
M2
[−β(t)p
∑
i∈V
(1− βi(t)) + q(1− β(t))q
∑
i∈V
βi(t)]
=
(q − p)
M
β(t)(1 − β(t)).
Again, the corresponding O.D.E. for the time-slots with
external influence can be written. Then, integrating over
the periods with and without influence for strategies SF
and SL and then comparing the net fraction of the opinion
Yes at time T for both the strategies concludes the proof.
We refer the readers to Saxena et al. (2020) for details as
the O.D.E.s obtained here are similar.
5.3 Proof of Proposition 1
LetH denote the hub in a hub and spoke graphG = (V,E)
with |V | = M . Let IH(t) denote the opinion of the hub in
time-slot t. For every i ∈ V \{H}, βi(t) =
1
|Ni|
∑
j∈Ni
Ij(t) =
IH(t). Therefore, we have:
(i) If IH(t) = IH(1) = 0, we have qt = 0, pt = p.
(ii) If IH(t) = IH(1) = 1, we have qt = q, pt = 0.
In either case, when there is external influence, we have
qt = q˜, pt = p˜ such that q˜ > q and p˜ < p. The proof then
follows from Lemma 2 and Theorem 1 Kumar et al. (2018).
We now prove the second part of the proposition. Note
that we focus on strategies that influence in bT consecutive
time-slots. Let ti denote the time at which the strategy
starts influencing and th denote the time at which the hub
is chosen. We analyze three separate cases by integrating
the corresponding O.D.E.s.
(a) 0 ≤ ti < ti + bT < th ≤ T :
Let βa(T ) denote the expected value of β(T ).
βa(T ) = pδ(th)β(th)e
− p
M
(T−th)
+(1− pδ(th))(1 − δ(th)e
− q
M
(T−th)),
where, δ(th) = δ(t0)e
− q
M
(th−bT )−q˜b
T
M .
(b) 0 ≤ ti ≤ th ≤ ti + bT ≤ T :
Let βb(T ) denote the expected value of β(T ).
βb(T ) = 1− δ(t0)e
− T
M
(q(1−b)+q˜b).
(c) 0 ≤ th < ti < ti + bT ≤ T :
Let βc(T ) denote the expected value of β(T ).
βc(T ) = (1− pδ(th))(1− δ(t0)e
−( T
M
)(q(1−b)+q˜b))
+pδ(th)(1− (1 − β(th)e
(− p
M
(ti−th))e−q˜b
T
M )
×e−
p
M
(T−ti−bT ),
where, δ(th) = δ(t0)e
−q
th
M .
We now show that β(T )a ≤ β(T )b. The proof of β(T )c ≤
β(T )b is similar. We have:
β(T )a =pδ(th)[β(th)e
− p
M
(T−th) + δ(th)e
− q
M
(T−th) − 1]
+ 1− δ(t0)e
− q
M
(th−bT )−q˜b
T
M
− q
M
(T−th)
=β(T )b + pδ(th)[β(th)e
− p
M
(T−th)
+ δ(th)e
− q
M
(T−th) − 1].
Since β(th) + δ(th) = 1, we get β(T )a ≤ β(T )b.
6. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we focus on characterizing optimal influenc-
ing strategies for networks where opinions of individuals
evolve based on a limited collection of opinions of indi-
viduals the network. We consider two ways in which this
collection of opinions is formed.
In the first case, each individual picks a random number
of opinions, each chosen uniformly at random to construct
the collection of opinions to get influenced by. In this
case, we observe that the nature of the optimal influencing
strategies is identical to the case where the collection
includes all the opinions in the network. In the second
case, each individual only takes into account the opinions
of her neighbors in a fixed graph. We observe that the
nature of the optimal influencing policies is dependent
on the nature of the graph. For multiple widely studied
graph models, like the d−regular, Baraba´si Albert and
Erdo¨s Re´nyi graphs, the optimal influencing strategies are
identical to the case where the collection includes all the
opinions in the network.
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